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Abstract 
Among the many ideas that go by the name of “enactivism” there is the idea 
that by “cognition” we should understand what is more commonly taken to be 
behavior.  For clarity, label such forms of enactivism “enactivismb.”  This ter-
minology requires some care in evaluating enactivistb claims.  There is a genu-
ine risk of enactivist and non-enactivist cognitive scientists talking past one 
another.  So, for example, when enactivistsb write that “cognition does not 
require representations” they are not necessarily denying what cognitivists 
claim when they write that “cognition requires representations.”  This paper 
will draw attention to instances of some of these unnecessary confusions. 
Keywords: enactivism; enaction; cognition; behavior; autopoiesis.  
 
In  soliciting  contributions  to  this  special  issue  of  Avant,  the  editors  asked 
whether enactivism fits cognition.   This question, however, may well misin-
terpret what at least some forms of enactivism are about.  It may underesti-
mate the breadth of the revolution that at least some strains of enactivism are 
championing.  For some in the enactivist movement, it appears that the goal is 
not merely to provide a revolutionary new account of what cognition is.  We 
need no more of that.   What is needed, instead, is a cognitive science that 
studies something else.  What is needed is a cognitive science that does not 
study cognition!  That would be a real revolution. 
But, what, one might ask, would such a really revolutionary cognitive science 
study, if not cognition?  One popular proposal is that it should study what has 
been, and generally continues to be, known as (a type of) behavior.
3  For con-
                                                             
3 Another way of making the present point might be to distinguish cognitione (for enactivist cogni-
tion) and cognitionc (for cognitivist cognition).  This might make it easier to see that this issue is 
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venience,  and  in  order  to  distinguish  this  form  of  enactivism  from  other 
forms, let us label it “enactivismb,” where the subscript indicates the focus on 
(a type of) behavior.  To be sure, not all those who think of themselves as en-
activists are enactivistsb.  Nevertheless, there are prominent representatives 
of enactivismb.  To take one salient example, many enactivistsb have been in-
spired, at least to some degree, by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s 
Autopoiesis and Cognition.  Maturana is relatively explicit about understand-
ing a cognitive system as a (self-maintaining) behaving system.  According to 
Maturana, “A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a do-
main of interactions in which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of 
itself, and the process of cognition is the actual (inductive) acting or behaving 
in this domain.” (Maturana and Varela 1980: 13).  To take a more recent ex-
ample, Tony Chemero proposes, “cognitive scientists ought to try to under-
stand cognition as intelligent behavior” (Chemero 2009: 25).  Further, he be-
lieves that “radical embodied cognitive science can explain cognition as the 
unfolding  of  a  brain-body-environment  system”  (Chemero  2009:  43).      But, 
“the unfolding of a brain-body-environment system” sounds like a metaphor 
for behavior.  
The foregoing point might be made in another way.  Notice that enactivistsb 
often propose their theory as an alternative to cognitivism, but they are not 
always explicit about what in the cognitivist view they reject.  As one example, 
Stewart, Gapenne, and Di Paolo write, 
The aim of this book is to present the paradigm of enaction as a framework for 
a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science as a whole. There have been many 
critiques of classical, first-generation cognitivism based on the Computational 
Theory of Mind. A distinctive feature of this book is a deliberate choice not to 
go over that old ground yet again, but to reserve the energy for positive explo-
ration of new paths.  (Stewart, Gapenne, and Di Paolo 2010: vii). 
Di Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, provide a similarly opened-ended rejec-
tion of cognitivism: 
Almost  two  decades  since  the  publication  of  The  Embodied  Mind  (Varela, 
Thompson, and Rosch 1991), the term enactive has moved out of relative ob-
scurity to become a fashionable banner in many regions of cognitive science.  
… Theirs was not only an achieved synthesis of existing criticisms to a predom-
inantly computationalist paradigm, but also the articulation of a set of postu-
lates to move these ideas forward. Indeed, the increasing use of enactive ter-
minology serves as an indication that the time is ripe for a new era in cogni-
tive science. To a great extent, we believe this to be so.  (Di Paolo, Rohde, and 
De Jaegher 2010: 33) 
                                                                                                                                                             
not about the “right” way to use “cognition” or who gets to use it how.  Those who prefer to use 
this terminology are free to use it, but this paper will adhere to the more mainstream usage.  The 
important point, of course, is not ultimately about the terminology, but the fact that cognitivists 
and some enactivists are talking about two different things. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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One might well think that enactivismb means to displace the cognitivist’s com-
putation  theoretic  apparatus  of  rules  and  (especially)  representations  with 
another sort of apparatus.  This alternative apparatus might be the mathemat-
ics of dynamical systems theory or one or another definition of autopoiesis.  
In such a vision, enactivismb and cognitivism are competing theories of the 
same thing in the way that Newton’s theory of gravitation and Einstein’s theo-
ry of general relativity were competing theories of a single putative force in 
nature, namely, gravity.  This, however, apparently underestimates just how 
sweeping a change the enactivistsb wish to make in cognitive science.  Enactiv-
istsb generally propose to walk away from the issues and concerns of main-
stream cognitive science to focus on what is commonly understood as behav-
ior.    In  practice,  therefore,  enactivistsb  use  different  tools  to  study  diffe-
rent issues. 
While  there  are  times  when  enactivistsb  enthusiastically  embrace  the  dra-
matic changes implicit in their work, they also tend to paper over the signifi-
cance of the proposal to study (a type of) behavior by calling behavior “cogni-
tion” or “lower-level cognition” or “basic cognition” or “minimal cognition.” 
(See, for example, Calvo and Keijzer 2009, Chemero 2009, Stewart 2010, Di 
Paolo, Rohde, and De Jaegher 2010, and Hutto and Myin 2013.)  This terminol-
ogy is likely to be misleading to mainstream cognitive scientists, but a more 
serious problem is that it seems to mislead even some enactivistsb.  There are 
times when they write as if they intend to address traditional, sometimes long-
standing, problems surrounding cognition.  Yet, because they use “cognition” 
as a term for (a type of) behavior, they are thereby not talking about the same 
thing as are the traditional cognitivists.  Thus, they sometimes fail to come to 
grips with traditional issues in cognitive science. 
This paper will begin, in section 1, with a brief review of the distinction be-
tween cognition and behavior as it has formerly been used in cognitive sci-
ence, namely, that cognitive processes have been thought to be among the 
many endogenous factors that contribute to the production of behavior.  The 
point here is not to offer definitions of “cognition” or “behavior” or to offer 
much in the way of clarification of what each of these is, but simply to draw 
attention to what has been a widely held understanding of the difference be-
tween the two.  Successive sections (sections 2-5) will then review ways in 
which  Stewart  2010,  Froese, Gershenson,  and Rosenblueth  2013, and  Hutto 
and  Myin  2013,  seem  not  to  appreciate  the  significance  of  their  departure 
from traditional problems of cognition.  Section 6 will emphasize the fact that 
not all enactivists are enactivistsb by providing clear examples of enactivists 
who offer a more traditional conception of cognition as a species of endoge-
nous cause of behavior. 
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As a final preliminary note, it is important to bear in mind that the goal of this 
paper is clarification, not criticism.  Enactivismb clearly represents a dramatic 
break  with  tradition.    Enactivists  have  made that  abundantly  clear.   What 
bears greater attention, however, is the character of this break.  Rather than 
examine endogenous causes of behavior, such as cognition, enactivismb pro-
poses to focus on (a type of) behavior.  What also bears attention are some of 
the ramifications of this break.  Insofar as enactivismb no longer addresses 
cognition as it has formerly been understood, it just so far threatens to ignore 
cognition.   Enactivismb, thus, does not so much solve traditional problems, as 
merely walks away from them.   This, of course, does not bear directly on the 
truth of enactivismb.  It only suggests that enactivistsb need to be more careful 
in how they deal with traditional problems.  If they want to talk about tradi-
tional cognition, they apparently need an account of endogenous influences 
on behavior.  Alternatively, if they wish to break with tradition, then they 
must be careful to make a cleaner break.  So, to repeat, the goal of this paper 
is not so much criticism of enactivismb as clarification. 
 
1. Cognition and Behavior 
One way in which to appreciate the core theoretical commitments of tradi-
tional cognitive science might be to revisit some of its founding documents, 
wherein the original commitments are articulated.  As an illustration of this 
method, Aizawa 2014, describes a bit of common ground between B. F. Skin-
ner and Noam Chomsky, namely, both believed that cognition was a putative-
ly explanatory causal factor in the production of behavior. Where Skinner 
and Chomsky differed, of course, was in their assessment of the genuine ex-
planatory value of the cognitive. (See, for example, Skinner 1957, and Chom-
sky 1959.)  Another paper that illustrates the core theoretical commitments of 
traditional  cognitive  science  is  the  seminal  1958  paper  by  Alan  Newell, 
J. C. Shaw, and Herbert Simon, “Elements of a Theory of Human Problem Solv-
ing.”  They propose that  
Questions about problem-solving behavior can be answered at various levels 
and  in  varying  degrees  of  detail.  The  theory  to  be  described  here  explains 
problem-solving behavior in terms of what we shall call information processes.  
If one considers the organism to consist of effectors, receptors, and a control 
system for joining these, then this theory is mostly a theory of the control sys-
tem. It avoids most questions of sensory and motor activities.  (Newell, Shaw, 
and Simon 1958: 151). 
This brief passage contains a number of ideas that are relevant to understand-
ing the differences between the traditional information processing approach 
in  cognitive  science  and  enactivismb.    These  features  are  worth  reviewing 
in detail. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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The very first sentence proposes to treat problem solving as a behavior.  Prob-
lem solving is, thus, not itself information processing or cognitive processing.  
In the literature on embodied and enactive cognition, one sometimes encoun-
ters the idea that problem solving is not behavior, but is instead cognitive pro-
cessing.  This claim is more complicated than one might expect.  It contains 
a subtle ambiguity.  There is one sense of this claim that is entirely uncontro-
versial and consistent with the Newell, Shaw, and Simon perspective.  It seems 
perfectly reasonable to claim that the entire process of, say, physically manip-
ulating pencil and paper to solve a cryptarithmetic problem counts as prob-
lem solving and cognitive processing.  This is the sense in which the whole of 
the process is cognitive processing in virtue of the fact that an important or 
salient component of the process is cognitive processing.  The whole of the 
manipulative  process  is  cognitive  processing,  even  though  strictly  speaking 
only a proper part of the process is cognitive processing.  The idea here might 
be understood through an analogy.  The whole of the process of baking a cake, 
one might say, is not strictly speaking a matter of baking a cake.  The process 
of baking a cake might include breaking some eggs and the mixing of ingredi-
ents,  processes  that  are  not  themselves  baking  processes  strictly  speaking.  
Similarly, the whole of the process of filling up one’s car is not strictly speak-
ing a matter of pumping gasoline into the tank.  It includes such things as 
slowing the car, pulling it into the station, and shutting off the engine.  In con-
trast to this unproblematic claim there is the idea that, strictly speaking, the 
whole of the process of manipulating the pencil and paper is cognitive pro-
cessing.  This would be the sense in which the whole of the process of baking 
a cake is literally the baking of a cake or the whole of the process of filling 
one’s gas tank is pumping gasoline into the tank.  What probably obscures the 
ambiguity in the claim that problem solving is cognitive processing is the rela-
tive lack of clarity about the character of the component processes.  There is 
a relatively clear distinction between slowing the car to pull it into the gas 
station and pumping the gasoline into the tank, but it is less clear how to dis-
tinguish the information processing that might take place only in the brain 
and what might be called the information processing that takes place in the 
pencil and paper.  It is, therefore, useful in discussing such cases to be clear on 
the strength of the claim that problem solving is cognitive processing.  The 
claim is subtler than one might have expected. 
Second, the passage from Newell, Shaw, and Simon treats behavior as distinct 
from cognitive or information processing.  Information processing is taken to 
be a mechanism realized in the brain.  This flatly contradicts the enactivistb 
idea that cognition is (a type of) behavior. 
Third, Newell, Shaw, and Simon propose that problem-solving behavior might 
be explained, in part, by appeal to information processing.  On this model, 
behavior  is  the  thing  to  be  explained,  whereas  information  processing  is 
among the factors that do the explaining.  They repeat this idea more emphat-The Enactivist Revolution 
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ically a bit later in their paper: “At this level of theorizing, an explanation of an 
observed behavior of the organism is provided by a program of primitive infor-
mation processes that generates this behavior” (ibid.)  This is a conception of 
information processing/cognition  they  shared  with  Chomsky.   Further,  it  is 
a  conception  Skinner  recognized  as  the  mainstream  conception,  arguing, 
however, that it is misguided.
4   Notice that, by proposing that behavior is dis-
tinct from information processing and that information processing is realized 
in the brain, Newell, Shaw, and Simon implicitly adopt what is sometimes de-
scribed as the framework of “mechanistic explanation.”  They propose to ex-
plain the behavior of a whole organism primarily by appeal to the behavior of 
one of its components.  This picture might be illustrated with a well-known 
image from Craver 2007.  (See Figure 1.)  In this scheme, S ψ-ing would be 
something like a participant in an experiment solving a problem, whereas, 
say, x3 ϕ3-ing would be the brain processing information. 
 
Figure 1.  Schema for mechanistic explanation. 
Redrawn from Craver 2007: 8, Figure 1.1. 
Fourth, and finally, Newell, Shaw, and Simon embrace the traditional cogni-
tive science focus on the role of information processing in the production of 
behavior, but they do not deny that there can be a role for sensory and motor 
activities in the production of behavior.  We can describe this view by refer-
ence to the Craver schema.  In the figure above, x1 φ1-ing might be the eye 
performing a saccade, where x4 φ4-ing might be writing with a pencil.  Thus, 
they recognize that there are many component processes that conspire in the 
production  of  behavior,  but  indicate  that  they  will  limit  their  attention  to 
a subset of these factors.  The focus of their attention is methodological, not 
theoretical.    In  other  words,  even  some  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  infor-
mation  processing  psychology  anticipated  a  day  when  psychologists  might 
                                                             
4 For a contemporary articulation of this picture, there is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
entry on cognitive science.  (Thagard 2010). AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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take up the issues concerning the contributions of sensory and motor factors 
to the production of behavior. 
This traditional picture of the relationship between cognition and behavior—
that cognition is among the factors that might explain behavior—is rarely, if 
ever,  explicitly  discussed  in  the  enactivist  literature.    Nevertheless,  if  one 
maintains that cognition is (a type of) behavior, one seems to be walking away 
from much of what cognitive science has been up to, namely, the study of pu-
tative endogenous contributions to the production of behavior.  Nevertheless, 
enactivistsb have often seemed willing to do this, suggesting that a fresh start 
for cognitive science is in order.  Setting aside questions about the wisdom of 
walking away from so much of the work that has been done in cognitive sci-
ence, this paper will show some of the missteps this has engendered. 
 
2. Bourgine and Stewart 2004 
Recall Maturana’s claim that “A cognitive system is a system whose organiza-
tion defines a domain of interactions in which it can act with relevance to the 
maintenance of itself, and the process of cognition is the actual (inductive) 
acting or behaving in this domain.” (Maturana and Varela 1980: 13).  It is not 
entirely clear what is going on in this brief passage.  Maturana apparently 
claims that the process of cognition is behaving in a domain—that cognition is 
a type of behavior—but one might have one’s doubts that he genuinely pro-
poses to identify cognition and behavior.  How is this conception of cognition 
supposed to relate to the traditional conception, if at all?  And, what are we to 
make of the character of this claim?  Is it supposed to be a definition, a con-
ceptual analysis, a theoretical hypothesis, or something else? It might well be 
read as a stipulative definition, but then again there are times when Maturana 
is prone to forceful pronouncements about empirical matters.  Matters here 
are not that clear. 
Some of the ambiguity in Maturana’s text is eliminated from the account in 
Bourgine and Stewart 2004.  The latter presentation is more deliberate and 
explicit about defining cognition as behavior and that this definition does not 
capture what is “ordinarily” meant by “cognition.”  Their proposal, therefore, 
at least looks more like a stipulative definition of “cognition.”  To provide their 
definition, they, first, define A interactions as those system-environment in-
teractions that have consequences for the internal state of an organism and 
B  interactions  as  those  system-environment  interactions  that  have  conse-
quences for an organism’s immediate environment or modify the relation of 
the organism to its environment.   These terms then figure into a definition 
of “cognition”:  The Enactivist Revolution 
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D-C1: A system is cognitive if and only if type A interactions serve to 
trigger type B interactions in a specific way, so as to satisfy a viabi-
lity constraint. 
Bourgine and Stewart explicitly decline to define what a “viability constraint” 
is, but the rough idea is that A interactions must trigger B interactions that 
are “good for” the system. This proposal seems to imply that systems are cog-
nitive  when  stimuli  provoke  them  to  behave  in  ways  that  they  are  “good 
for” the  system.    And  Bourgine  and  Stewart  subsequently  substantiate  this 
interpretation: 
It may be useful to illustrate this by examples of interactions such as falling 
down stairs, eating, or breathing (including the breathing of a poisonous but 
odorless gas). Ordinarily, such interactions are not considered as “cognitive.” 
On the definition proposed here, they will not be cognitive unless the conse-
quences for the internal state of the system are employed to trigger specific ac-
tions that promote the viability of the system. Thus, falling down stairs will be 
cognitive if but only if the fall triggers reactions such as a modification of mus-
cle tone that limits the damage; and this does require specific sensory and mo-
tor organs. Similarly, eating is cognitive if but only if it triggers a reaction of 
satiety that prevents damage from overeating; breathing a poisonous gas is 
cognitive if but only if it triggers evasive action, which will require a specific 
sensory organ to detect the poison, and the resulting sensation to trigger an 
appropriate, coordinated motor response.   (Bourgine and Stewart 2010: 338).   
Bourgine and Stewart evidently concur with the cognitivist view that falling 
down stairs, eating, and breathing are not ordinarily considered to be cogni-
tive (processes).  Yet, they differ from cognitivists in their rationale for this 
assessment.  For Bourgine and Stewart, it is only some instances of falling 
down stairs, eating, and breathing that are not to count as cognitive, namely, 
those in which there are no prophylactic effects, such as changes in muscle 
tone or satiety.  For cognitivists, however, falling down, eating, and breathing 
are not, strictly speaking, cognitive processes at all;
5 they are, at most, behav-
ior.  Moreover, they are likely to receive distinct behavioral analyses.  By cog-
nitivist lights, many instances of eating may count as cognitive behaviors inso-
far as they require cognitive processes in order to do things such as recognize 
food or to plan how to use knife and fork to obtain bite-sized pieces of food.   
By contrast, instances of breathing may not count as cognitive behaviors inso-
far as they do not involve cognitive processing.  Humans typically breathe 
without thinking about it.  Non-cognitive autonomic processes generally suf-
fice  for  breathing.    Finally,  relatively  few  cases  of  falling  down  stairs  will 
count  as  cognitive  behaviors.    Usually,  gravity  can  do  most  of  the  work 
of   tumbling  someone  down  stairs  without  their  really  thinking  about  it.   
                                                             
5 For clarification of the qualifier, “strictly speaking,” recall the first point in the discussion of the 
passage from Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1958, in section 1 above. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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The point  here,  of  course,  is  not  to  pin  down  precise  frequencies  or  anal-
yses  of  these cases, but merely to give a nod to the sorts of factors that will 
enter into cognitivist analyses and to contrast them with Bourgine and Ste-
wart’s analysis. 
As we have just seen, the traditionalist might well claim that Bourgine and 
Stewart’s theory is subject to counterexamples in which they call things that 
are not cognitive, cognitive.  Falling down stairs is not a cognitive process, 
even though Bourgine and Stewart’s theory says it is.  A traditionalist can also 
easily imagine cases in which Bourgine and Stewart’s theory would call cogni-
tive processes “non-cognitive.”  So, imagine a person, Jane, looking out the 
window and seeing a cloudy day and thinking, “It looks like rain.”  This looks 
to be what Bourgine and Stewart would call an A interaction.  Jane might then 
think, “Maybe I should take my umbrella.  But, then again, I have a lot to carry 
today.  Maybe I should just chance it and leave my umbrella at home,” before 
she finally walks out the door.
6  Jane’s interior monologue and the walking out 
the door looks to be what Bourgine and Stewart would call a B interaction: it is 
a  system-environment  interaction  that modifies  the  relation  of  Jane  to  her 
environment.  But,  now,  suppose  that  a  dramatic  cloudburst  drenches  Jane 
and  that  this  is  not good  for  her.    By  Bourgine  and  Stewart’s  enactivismb, 
Jane’s interior monologue was not a cognitive process, nor was there anything 
like  a  thought  process  underlying  her  interior  monologue.    This  looks,  to 
a cognitivist,  like  a counterexample  to  Bourgine  and  Stewart’s  theory  in 
which a cognitive process is mistakenly labeled “non-cognitive.”
7 
At this point, one might propose that Bourgine and Stewart can simply stand 
by their stipulative definition of what a cognitive process is.  Their theory does 
not  capture  traditional  “intuitions,”  “theories,”  or—one  might  say,  “false 
leads,” but that is not what it is meant to do.  Bourgine and Stewart, therefore, 
have a kind of theoretical “safety” in offering a stipulative definition of what 
                                                             
6 Benny Shannon is an enactivist (though not an enactivistb) for whom the study of such thought 
sequences is crucially important.  (Cf., Shannon 2010.)  As will emerge, Bourgine and Stewart’s 
theory of cognition appears to have the consequence that some of the thought sequences that 
Shannon has studied will not be cognitive.  Or, if one prefers, Bourgine and Stewart’s theory of 
cognitionb appears to have the consequence that some of the thought sequences that Shannon has 
studied will not be cognitiveb. 
7 This sort of scenario can be used to draw attention to another feature of Bourgine and Stewart’s 
account.    We  cannot  tell  just  from  the  occurrence  of  the  A  interaction  and  the  B  interaction 
whether or not a process is cognitive in Bourgine and Stewart’s sense.  Whether Jane’s interior 
monologue was (indicative of) a cognitive process or not apparently depends on whether or not it 
actually rains and what impact this has on her.  So, if it does not rain and this turns out to be good 
for  Jane,  say  by  sparing  her  the  burden  of  carrying  an  unnecessary  umbrella,  then  we  have 
a cognitive process.  Alternatively, if a downpour drenches Jane and this is not good for her, then 
the interior monologue would not be (indicative of) a cognitive process.  Bourgine and Stewart’s 
theory makes a process cognitive or non-cognitive based on  contingent events that take place 
after the putative thought process. The Enactivist Revolution 
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they  mean  by  “cognition.”    The  problem  with  this,  however,  is  that  when 
Stewart tries to use the theory to address traditional problems, he thereby 
misses his target. 
Stewart claims that “There are two basic requirements for any paradigm in 
cognitive science: it must provide a genuine resolution of the mind-body prob-
lem, and it must provide for a genuine core articulation between a multiplici-
ty of disciplines”  (Stewart, 2010: 1).  He then proposes a solution to the mind-
body problem: 
As discussed in Bourgine and Stewart 2004, we may define a system as "cogni-
tive" if and only if it generates its actions, and the feedback sensations serve to 
guide  actions,  in  a  very  specific  way  so  as  to  maintain  its  autopoiesis  and 
hence its very existence. With these definitions, "cognition" and "life" are fun-
damentally the same phenomena; and, in principle, the mind-matter problem 
is solved. (Stewart 2010: 1-3). 
Thus, Stewart has proposed to solve the mind-body problem by a form of type 
identity theory: cognitive processes are biological processes (life processes).
8  
Then biological/life  processes are,  in  turn,  identified  with  physico-chemical 
processes (Cf., Stewart 2010: 203). So, it looks like Stewart and his enactivismb 
strike squarely at one of the central issues in the philosophy of mind. 
Appearances here are deceiving.  If Stewart maintains that by “cognition” he 
does not mean what has traditionally been meant by cognition—if he does not 
correctly  characterize  what  has traditionally been  meant by  “cognition”  or 
“the mind,” then he is not addressing the traditional mind-body problem.  The 
traditional mind-body problem has not been concerned with how to relate 
falling down, eating, or breathing to biological or physico-chemical processes.  
Instead, the traditional mind-body problem concerns what is perhaps a clus-
ter of problems, none of which centers on behaviors. 
Notice  that  the  mind-body  problem  as  found  in  Descartes’  philosophy  is 
a question of how there could be causal interactions between an immaterial 
soul or mind and a material body.  But, this is a question of how cognition, as 
traditionally construed, can interact with bodily processes.  It is not a question 
of how cognition, construed as behavior, can interact with bodily processes.  
Stewart’s  “cognition”  does  not  speak to  the  Cartesian  version  of  the  mind-
body problem. 
Kim 2005, however, observes that the Cartesian mind-body problem is not the 
contemporary mind-body problem found in the philosophy of mind and cog-
                                                             
8 One might well make the case that Stewart does not have a type identity theory solution but 
a functionalist  solution.    The  difference  probably  does  not  make  a  difference  here,  since  the 
weakness in Stewart’s purported solution lies in his view that cognition is viable behavior.  Maybe 
there are other enactivistb tools for dealing with this portion of the traditional mind-body prob-
lem, but the Bourgine-Stewart theory of cognition alone will not suffice. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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nitive science.  Instead, the contemporary mind-body problem appears to be 
a cluster of problems.  One of these is a problem of mental causation.  This 
problem,  however,  is  not  (at  least  in  the  first  instance)  about  how  bodily 
movements can be causally efficacious; it is about how internal states and 
processes, such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and decisions, could be among 
the causes of behavior.  (Cf, Kim 2005: 7f).  If Stewart is not thinking of cogni-
tive states as internal causes of behavior, then he is not grappling with the 
mental causation portion of the mind-body problem.   A second problem in 
the cluster of mind-body problems is the problem of consciousness.  By con-
sciousness, Kim has in mind qualitative features such as “the smell of the sea 
in a cool morning breeze, the lambent play of sunlight on brilliant autumn 
foliage, the fragrance of a field of lavender in bloom, and the vibrant, layered 
soundscape projected by a string quartet” (Kim 2005: 11).  David Chalmers 
seems to have a similar thing in mind, though described with different exam-
ples:  “the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C” (Chalmers 1995: 
201).  Insofar as Stewart’s theory of “cognition”  (or mind) does not capture 
what is traditionally meant, but constitutes a stipulative definition not tied to 
these cases, Stewart evidently fails to address the traditional mind-body prob-
lem.   We might concede, if only for the sake of being agreeable, that Bourgine 
and Stewart do solve a version of the mind-body problem, namely, the version 
that shows how cognition defined in D-C1 can be related to the body.  But, 
even with that concession, it remains true that Stewart has not resolved the 
traditional  mind-body  problem(s).  Instead,  enactivismb  threatens  to  leave 
aside old issues for new issues. 
So, to summarize this section, one might begin with the possibility that Bour-
gine and Stewart have proposed a definition of “cognition” that is meant to 
capture  what  has  traditionally  been  thought  of  as  cognition.  Two  sorts  of 
counterexamples, however, challenge this view.  1) Falling down stairs is not 
a cognitive process; it is (at best) a cognitive behavior.  2) Interior monologues 
constitute, or are indicative of, cognitive processes even in cases where these 
interior monologues (or the processes underlying them) lead to bad outcomes 
for their possessors. In light of these considerations, it is perhaps better to 
interpret Bourgine and Stewart as not merely overthrowing the theoretical 
apparatus  of cognitivism  with  its computational rules  and  representations.  
Instead, they also propose to overthrow the putative exemplars of cognition.  
Cognition is not one among many possible endogenous causal contributors to 
behavior; it is, instead, viable behavior.  If, however, this is what Stewart is up 
to, then he appears to be walking away from many of the problems that cogni-
tivism faced.  For example, Stewart’s identification of cognition and life does 
not solve the traditional mind-body problem.  It solves, at best, a novel version 
of the mind-body problem. 
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3. Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth 2013 
The hypothesis of extended cognition, in at least some of its earliest articula-
tions,  maintains  that,  while  brains  realize  some  cognitive  processes,  some-
times,  under  certain  conditions,  larger  configurations  of  brain,  body,  and 
world also realize cognitive processes.  This is the conception that was implicit 
in parts of Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ seminal paper.  (See Clark and 
Chalmers 1998.)  It was the conception in play in the two “cognitive equiva-
lence” arguments based on the play of the video game Tetris and the Inga-Otto 
thought experiment.   Recall the description of three modes of Tetris play: 
(1) A person sits in front of a computer screen which displays images of vari-
ous two-dimensional geometric shapes and is asked to answer questions con-
cerning the potential fit of such shapes into depicted "sockets". To assess fit, 
the person must mentally rotate the shapes to align them with the sockets. 
(2) A person sits in front of a similar computer screen, but this time can choose 
either to physically rotate the image on the screen, by pressing a rotate button, 
or to mentally rotate the image as before. We can also suppose, not unrealisti-
cally, that some speed advantage accrues to the physical rotation operation. 
(3) Sometime in the cyberpunk future, a person sits in front of a similar com-
puter screen. This agent, however, has the benefit of a neural implant which 
can perform the rotation operation as fast as the computer in the previous ex-
ample. The agent must still choose which internal resource to use (the implant 
or the good old fashioned mental rotation), as each resource makes different 
demands  on  attention  and  other  concurrent  brain  activity.  (Clark  and 
Chalmers 1998: 7). 
Case  (1)  looks  to  be  a  case  of  someone  playing  the  video  game  using  old-
fashioned, brain-internal information processing.  By contrast, (2) and (3) are 
supposed to be cognitively the same as (1) with the only difference between 
them  being  the  material  substrates  that  realize  cognition.    Next  recall  the 
Inga-Otto thought experiment.  Inga has normal human memory, reads that 
there is an interesting exhibit at the Museum of Modern Art, and decides that 
she would like to see it.  She thinks for a moment, recalls that it is on 53
rd St., 
then heads on her way.  By contrast, Otto is suffering from the early stages of 
Alzheimer’s  Disease,  so  he  has  developed  a  system  for  maintaining  infor-
mation in a notebook.  In this notebook, he has the address of the Museum of 
Modern Art.  When he reads of the exhibit at the museum, he decides that he 
would like to see it.  He then picks up his notebook, flips through it until he 
finds the address, then heads on his way.  Clark and Chalmers claim that “in 
relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto 
the same role that memory plays for Inga.  The information in the notebook 
functions  just  like  the  information  constituting  an  ordinary  non-occurrent 
belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the skin” (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998: 13). AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Whereas  Clark and  Chalmers sometimes  offer “cognitive  equivalence  argu-
ments”  for  extended  cognition,  Froese,  Gershenson,  and Rosenblueth  2013, 
propose a different path.  They reject the idea that there is ever any brain-
bound, information processing type cognition of the sort that Inga was said to 
have.  Instead, they adopt the enactivistb view that cognition is (a type of) be-
havior: “cognition is primarily conceived of as a form of viable conduct by an 
agent  in  an  environment”  (Froese,  Gershenson,  and  Rosenblueth  2013:  1).  
Thus, they take it that “[the Dynamical Systems Hypothesis] takes the notion of 
an extended mind as its starting point, rather than as a curious exception” 
(ibid.)    Froese,  Gershenson,  and  Rosenblueth,  therefore,  defend  extended 
“cognition” in the sense of extended adaptive behavior.  This path, however, 
does nothing to help the version of extended cognition in the Tetris and Inga-
Otto examples.  Through those examples, Clark and Chalmers maintained the 
bold conclusion that what was once thought to have been realized only in the 
brain—a type of information processing—is, in fact, also sometimes realized 
in the brain, body, and world.  Thus, Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth, do 
not so much defend the hypothesis of extended cognition as leave it in favor of 
the hypothesis of extended viable conduct.
9  
Suppose, then, for the sake of argument that we follow Froese, Gershenson, 
and Rosenblueth and think about viable conduct.  If so, then the further step 
to the view that such “cognition” is extended is trivial.  “Conduct” is essentially 
another word for behavior and behavior typically is realized by brain, body, 
and world.  In cases in which hammering in a nail is a viable behavior, it is 
apparently realized by cognitive, attentional, and motivational processes in 
the brain, along with the propagation of light in the eye, along with muscular 
processes in the arms, and contact between the hammer and a nail.  Who 
would doubt that?  Why would anyone doubt that?  So, where the hypothesis 
of extended cognition is a controversial hypothesis, the hypothesis of extend-
ed  viable  conduct appears  to  be  widely  if  not  universally accepted.    What 
makes  the  latter  appear  interesting  is  the  enactivistb  terminology  of  using 
“cognition” as a term for viable conduct, where most cognitive scientists think 
of “cognition” as a term for cognition. 
Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth appear to appreciate that they cannot 
rely on the view that cognition is a form of viable conduct in order to argue 
for the extended cognition hypothesis.  Therefore, they argue that “even if we 
accept  [the]  internalist  starting  point,  a  proper  understanding  of  neuronal 
activity will force us to accept an extended view of the mind nonetheless.” 
(Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth 2013: 2).  Given this concession, they 
propose two distinct arguments for extended cognition.  There is an extensive 
                                                             
9 If one prefers, one might say that Clark and Chalmers defend something more like extended 
cognitionc, where Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth defend extended cognitionb.  Again, the 
body of the text uses more standard terminology. The Enactivist Revolution 
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discussion of an evolutionary robotics simulation, but the details of that are 
irrelevant to their arguments, so will not be reviewed. 
Consider their two arguments in reverse order of their appearance.  Their 
second argument is relatively simple: 
6. The non-isolated [Continuous-Time Recurrent Neural Network]’s output is 
determined by its input, albeit mediated by its internal activity, while this in-
put is determined by its motor output, albeit mediated by bodily and environ-
mental (including social) activity. 
7. It logically follows from the above that the non-isolated CTRNN’s additional 
neural complexity is partially constituted by its own sensorimotor and social 
coupling. (Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth 2013: 6).
10 
This is a relatively simple version of the infamous “coupling-constitution fal-
lacy”.
11  Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth’s contention notwithstanding, 
the second sentence above does not logically follow from the first.  In the most 
simplistic of coupling arguments, one might observe that a cognitive process X 
is causally influenced by a prima facie non-cognitive process Y, then infer that 
the appearances of these processes are misleading.  Instead, the entire Y-X 
process is a cognitive process. The Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth ex-
ample, however, is a bit more complicated, since there are supposed to be 
reciprocal causal connections wherein Y causally influences X and X causally 
influences Y.   
Reciprocal causal connections, however, do not suffice to close the gap be-
tween causation and constitution.  Suppose we accept the internalist view that 
the  non-isolated  CTRNN  has  some  “neural  complexity.”    The  premise  in  6 
notes that the CTRNN output is causally determined by its input and its input 
is causally determined by its output.  This is a causal premise.  The conclusion, 
however, is that the “additional neural complexity” is constituted by the pro-
cesses outside of the CTRNN.  But, why go beyond thinking that the additional 
neural  complexity  is  merely  causally  influenced  by  processes  outside  the 
CTRNN?  There seems to be no warrant for the conclusion that the additional 
neural complexity is constituted by external processes.
12  Note that, in a nor-
                                                             
10 Technically, the argument seems to be for extended “neural complexity,” whatever that is.  To 
make this relevant to the hypothesis of extended cognition, there would need to be some link 
between “neural complexity” and cognition and it is unclear what Froese, Gershenson, and Ros-
enblueth propose this link to be.  They think that cognition is viable conduct, not neural complexi-
ty.  And, traditional cognitivism takes cognition to be something like rule-governed, symbol ma-
nipulation or information processing, not “neural complexity.” For present purposes, however, 
these idiosyncrasies can be set aside. 
11 Cf., e.g., Block 2005, Adams & Aizawa 2008, Rupert 2009. 
12 Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth seem to think that it matters whether the environment 
qualitatively changes the CTRNN implementing an artificial nervous system (ANS):  AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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mally functional HVAC system, the thermostat’s output is determined by its 
input, albeit mediated by its internal activity, while its input is determined by 
its output, albeit mediated by environmental activity, such as the burning of 
natural gas in the furnace.  Nevertheless, the change of shape of the bimetallic 
strip in the thermostat is still limited to the bimetallic strip.   
Froese,  Gershenson,  and  Rosenblueth’s  second  argument  relies  on  a distin-
ction between the properties of parts and the properties of wholes and the 
idea that these properties are often qualitatively distinct.  This is an idea that 
is quite familiar from the literature on mechanistic explanation and is illus-
trated in Figure 1, in section 1, above.  The idea is that entities do things in 
virtue of their parts doing qualitatively distinct things.  The idea also appears 
in the enactivism literature in the introduction to Hutchins 2010: 
Distributed cognition is a framework for exploring the cognitive implications 
of  the  commonsense observation  that  in systems characterized  by  multiple 
levels of  interacting  elements,  different  properties  may  emerge  at  different 
levels of organization. Thus, a colony of social insects has different properties 
than any individual insect in the colony. At the level of organisms, bodies have 
different properties than organs, which have different properties than cells. In 
the realm of cognition, a neural circuit has different properties than any of the 
neurons in the circuit. The same can be said of a brain area with respect to the 
neural circuits that compose it, or of an entire brain with respect to the areas 
that interact within the brain. This is also true of the body/brain system with 
respect to either brain or body, and the world/body/brain system with respect 
to any of its parts. A system composed of a person in interaction with a cogni-
tive artifact has different cognitive properties than those of the person alone.  
(Hutchins 2010: 425.) 
Froese,  Gershenson,  and  Rosenblueth,  propose  to  avoid  the  coupling-
constitution fallacy by appeal to something like this picture: 
This critique is known as the “coupling-constitution fallacy”. In this paper we 
respond to this reductionist challenge by using an evolutionary robotics ap-
                                                                                                                                                             
our aim is to build a model of an embodied agent, whose artificial nervous system (ANS) has 
mathematical properties that are in principle impossible for it to have in isolation. The moti-
vation for this criterion is the need to go beyond a demonstration of how an agent’s situated-
ness within a sensorimotor loop modulates the internal activity of the ANS, but can transform 
the ANS into a qualitatively different kind of system altogether.  
if an ANS with less than 3D is nonlinearly coupled with other non-chaotic systems, and its in-
ternal neural activity spontaneously becomes chaotic, then an explanation of this property as 
resulting from an extended process of interaction cannot be accused of committing the cou-
pling-constitution fallacy.  (Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth 2013: 2). 
So, their idea is that when this ANS interacts with the environment, it undergoes a qualitative 
shift. It becomes chaotic.  But, what does this have to do with cognition?  It isn’t that becoming 
chaotic is the same as becoming cognitive, is it?  And, what does this have to do with what does, or 
does not, constitute a cognitive process?  Why not stick with the idea that interaction with the 
environment causes the ANS to become chaotic? The Enactivist Revolution 
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proach  to  create  a  minimal  model  of  two  acoustically  coupled  agents.  We 
demonstrate how the interaction process as a whole has properties that can-
not be reduced to the contributions of the isolated agents. We also show that 
the neural dynamics of the coupled agents has formal properties that are in-
herently impossible for those neural networks in isolation.  (Froese, Gershen-
son, and Rosenblueth 2013: 1). 
From the perspective of the DSH, which proposes a distributed view of cogni-
tion as the default mode of cognition, there is no coupling-constitution fallacy 
because properties of the sensorimotor interaction process cannot be reduced 
to  that  of  the  isolated  components.  (Froese,  Gershenson,  and  Rosenblueth 
2013: 6). 
It is a good strategy for the EMH to highlight that ongoing interaction between 
a cognitive agent and environment results in a novel, mutually encompassing 
process with new properties of its own. (Ibid.) 
With  this  picture,  the  work-around  for  the  coupling-constitution  fallacy  is 
easy.  There are brain properties, bodily properties, environmental properties, 
and brain-body-environment properties.  In other words, there are properties 
the brain has, properties the body has, properties the environment has, and 
properties a brain-body-environment system has.  One does not need to say 
that  it  is  interaction  between  brain,  body,  and  world  that  converts  bodily 
properties  and  environmental  properties  into  new  properties.    Instead, 
a  causal  interaction  between  brainy,  bodily,  and  environmental  processes 
gives rise to a new, qualitatively distinct, emergent property that is cognitive.  
Problem averted. 
Notice that, for this argument, one does not really need a whole lot of evolu-
tionary robotics simulation.  It depends primarily on the picture of mechanis-
tic  explanation  according  to  which  higher  level  properties  are  realized  by 
properties of lower level individuals.  All of that is fine.  There is, however, 
one tacit premise that is the downfall of this reply to the coupling-constitution 
fallacy.  Recall that Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth proposed to begin 
with the internalist assumption that cognitive processes are realized by the 
brain.  Recall that they wanted to show that “even if we accept [the] internalist 
starting point, a proper understanding of neuronal activity will force us to 
accept an extended view of the mind nonetheless.” (Froese, Gershenson, and 
Rosenblueth 2013: 2).  But, if they concede that assumption, namely, that the 
brain properties are cognitive, then given their other premise that the proper-
ties of the brain-body-world system are qualitatively distinct from the proper-
ties of the brain, the body, and the world, then this gives us the beginnings of 
an argument that the properties of the brain-body-world system are not cogni-
tive!  The argument potentially backfires. 
Of course, Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth may be too quick to concede 
that brain properties are cognitive.  Perhaps they should simply stick to their 
view that cognitive processes are instances of viable conduct.  If they do that, AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
 
35 
 
however, then there really is no need for the coupling kinds of arguments at 
all.  Clearly viable conduct is extended.  As noted above, no one doubts that 
when hammering in a nail is a viable behavior, it is probably realized by cog-
nitive,  attentional, and  motivational processes  in  the  brain,  along  with  the 
propagation of light in the eye, along with muscular processes in the arms, 
and physical processes in the hammer, nail, and wood.  Once you have the 
view that cognition is a type of behavior, it is relatively smooth sailing to the 
conclusion that such “cognition” is extended.  
So,  the  upshot  of  our  discussion  of  Froese,  Gershenson,  and  Rosenblueth’s 
paper is three-fold.  If they wish to defend the view that viable conduct is ex-
tended, then they are doing nothing to support one of the original versions of 
the idea that cognition is extended.  They are not at all supporting the idea 
that some sort of information processing style of cognition is extended.  Sec-
ond, if they wish to defend the view that viable conduct is extended, then they 
are not defending a view that it seems anyone has ever doubted.  The stand-
ard view in cognitive science is that conduct or behavior is extended.  Third, 
the appeal to the framework of mechanistic explanation does nothing to avoid 
the problems of the coupling-constitution fallacy, unless one begins with the 
assumption that cognition is a property of a brain-body-world system.  But, if 
one has that assumption, there is no need for further argumentation using the 
framework of mechanistic explanation.  Properties of a brain-body-world sys-
tem are clearly extended.   What this suggests is that, by taking “cognition” to 
be a term for viable conduct, rather than for some endogenous causal con-
tributor to the production of conduct, Froese, Gershenson, and Rosenblueth 
have marginalized their view from the concerns of extended cognition and 
the coupling-constitution fallacy. 
 
4. Hutto and Myin 2013 
From the earliest pages of their Radicalizing Enactivism, Daniel Hutto and Erik 
Myin challenge the view that all cognition requires representations.  Their 
alternative is Radically Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (REC): 
The most radical versions of these approaches are marked by their uncom-
promising and thoroughgoing rejection of intellectualism about the basic na-
ture of mind, abandoning the idea that all mentality involves or implies con-
tent. Call this—the view we defend—Radically Enactive (or Embodied) Cogni-
tion—REC for short.  (Hutto and Myin 2013: 1) 
Embodied ways of thinking reject the familiar explanatory framework of or-
thodox cognitive science in favor of alternative platforms. Adherents of such 
views deny that the best way to explain cognition is to posit the construction of 
internal representational models (ibid.: 2) The Enactivist Revolution 
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Defenders of REC argue that the usual suspects—representation and computa-
tion—are not definitive of, and do not form the basis of, all mentality. (ibid.: 3).  
Notice  in  these  claims  they  write  of  rejecting  “the  familiar  explanatory 
framework of cognitive science” and “the usual suspects—representation and 
computation.”  The familiar view, however, is that all cognition, understood as 
one of the internal, brain-realized causes of behavior, involves representation.  
The tradition does not, however, maintain that (adaptive) behavior involves 
representation.  Plants, for example, might display adaptive behaviors, such 
as  phototropism,  without deploying  representations  to do  this.    Such cases 
would be cases in which plants produce behaviors that are not cognitive be-
haviors.  They are not behaviors that are produced, in part, through cogni-
tive processes. 
By contrast, when Hutto and Myin stake out their own view about cognition, 
they apparently  have  a different conception  of  cognition.    They use  “basic 
cognition” as a phrase to describe what sounds like behavior: “We restrict our 
ambitions to promoting REC, calling upon strong versions of two theses. We 
dub these the Embodiment Thesis and the Developmental-Explanatory Thesis. 
The former equates basic cognition with concrete spatio-temporally extended 
patterns of dynamic interaction between organisms and their environments.”  
(Hutton and Myin 2013: 5).  For Hutto and Myin, “basic cognition” is concrete 
spatio-temporally extended patterns of dynamic interaction between organ-
isms and their environments.  This is a description of what traditional cogni-
tive science would call “behavior.” They also seem to use “cognition” as a term 
for behavior.  In the early pages of their book, they write that “proponents of 
Enactive  and  Embodied  ways  of  thinking  reject  the  familiar  explanatory 
framework  of  orthodox  cognitive  science  in favor  of  alternative  platforms.  
Adherents of such views deny that the best way to explain cognition is to posit 
the construction of internal representational models built on the basis of re-
trieved informational content.” (Hutto and Myin: 2). It is somewhat odd to say 
that traditional approaches explain cognition by positing the construction of 
internal representational models.  As we saw with Newell, Shaw, and Simon, 
the traditional approach is to explain behavior by positing representations, 
among other things.  This oddity disappears, however, if we understand them 
to use “cognition” as a word for behavior.  Second, they claim that “Enactivism 
is inspired by the insight that the embedded and embodied activity of living 
beings provides the right model for understanding minds.”  (ibid.: 4).  Embed-
ded and embodied activity, which sounds like another description of behav-
ior, probably would be a very good model for the mind, if the mental were 
the behavioral.  
The stage is now set for traditional cognitive science to go about its business of 
studying cognition that purportedly must involve representations, where en-
activismb goes about its business of studying behavior which need not involve AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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representations.    Nevertheless,  things  do  not  go  so  smoothly.    Hutto  and 
Myin’s use of the phrase “basic cognition” muddies what might otherwise be 
a very simple argument.  Hutto and Myin want to challenge the standard view 
that all cognition requires representation and one way they wish to do this is 
by providing counterexamples.  As a point of logic, they evidently want a case, 
or two, in which there is cognition without representation.  But, instead of 
cases in which there is cognition without representation, they only provide 
cases of their “basic cognition” without representation.  That is, they only pro-
vide cases of behavior without representation. 
Hutto and Myin’s two putative counterexamples are Rodney Brooks’ behavior-
based robots and Barbara Webb’s models of cricket phonotaxis.  (See Brooks 
1997,  Webb  1994,  1996.)    Even  as  Hutto  and  Myin  describe  the  example, 
Brooks’ robots show only cases of behavior that does not require representa-
tion: “Brooks’ first-generation behavior-based robots, and those that followed, 
succeed precisely because their behaviors are directly guided by continuous, 
temporally extended interactions with aspects of their environments, rather 
than  being  based  on  represented  internal knowledge  about  those  domains 
(knowledge that would presumably be stored somewhere in the robots’ in-
nards).”  (ibid.: 42).  Such an analysis is irrelevant to mainstream cognitive 
science, since it only shows that behavior does not require representation, not 
that cognition does not require representation.  Thinking of “cognition” and 
“behavior” as referring to the same thing seems to mislead Hutto and Myin.  
The same oversight appears in their analysis of Webb’s models of crickets.  By 
their own analysis, “Webb’s (1994, 1996) work on cricket phonotaxis offers 
a vivid example of a model of how successful navigation takes place in the 
wild, apparently without the need for representations or their manipulation. 
… In other words, the capacity of these animals to adjust their behavior when 
successfully locating mates requires them to engage in a continuous interac-
tive process of engagement with the environment.” (ibid.: 43).  So, by Hutto 
and Myin’s own analysis, these are only cases of behavior without representa-
tion; not cases of cognition without representation.
13 
What the foregoing suggests is that enactivistb terminology confuses even Hut-
to and Myin.  It complicates what should be a simple exercise is trying to gen-
erate a counterexample to the claim that all cognition requires representation.  
Rather than offering examples of cognition that do not involve representation, 
they only offer examples of behavior that do not involve representation.  This, 
of course, only shows that one argument for REC has not worked.  It does not 
show that the argument cannot be fixed, as by revisiting the examples and 
                                                             
13 AUTHOR shows how  Chemero 2009, makes  much the same sort of mistake in thinking that 
models in Beer 2003, and van Rooij, Bongers, and Haselager 2002, “show how radical embodied 
cognitive science can explain cognition as the unfolding of a brain-body-environment system, and 
not as mental gymnastics” (Chemero 2009: 43).   The Enactivist Revolution 
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showing how they have internal mechanisms that are plausibly cognitive, but 
which nevertheless contain no representations.  Nor does it show that there 
are no other arguments for REC that might work.
14   Much less does it show 
that REC is false.  As billed at the outset, the goal here is to clarify some of mis-
steps in the enactivistb revolution.  The point of clarification here is that Hutto 
and Myin’s formulation of an argument based on the Brooks and Webb mod-
els do not work as billed. 
 
5. Not all Enactivists are Enactivistsb 
The goal of this paper has not been to critique the whole of the enactivist pro-
gram.  As is often noted, enactivism is still in its formative stages and many 
ideas remain to be worked out on many different topics.  Some authors asso-
ciated with enactivism do not seem to be concerned with cognition at all.  So, 
for example, Barbaras 2010, which was included in Stewart, Gapenne, and Di 
Paolo’s Enaction anthology, wrote about life and metabolism and barely men-
tioned cognition.  Moreover, as is to be emphasized now, not all enactivists are 
enactivistsb.  One can say this, but its force might be better appreciated if we 
describe enactivists who are not enactivistsb.   
Perhaps one of the more significant examples is that, some years ago, Stewart 
seems not to have been an enactivistb.
15  In the abstract to a 1996 paper, Stew-
art writes, “In contemporary cognitive science, there are two distinct para-
digms with contrasting definitions of cognition. The computational theory of 
mind  is  based  on  the  syntaxical manipulation  of  symbolic representations; 
this paradigm  is  objectivist  because  the  postulate  of a unique  independent 
reality is necessary as a referential basis for semantic grounding of the sym-
bols. The alternative ‘constructivist’ paradigm is based on the biological meta-
phor ‘cognition = life’ and programmatically follows the evolution of cognition 
from bacteria to civilized humans; it is non-objectivist.” (Stewart 1996: 311).  
Rather than articulating two distinct accounts of what cognition is, however, 
Stewart appears to be thinking of something along the lines of what philoso-
phers might interpret as a distinction between a form of realism and a form of 
anti-realism: “In an objectivist [computationalist] perspective, cognition is the 
subjective representation of an ontologically independent objective reality. In 
a  constructivist  perspective,  based  on  the  biological  metaphor  ‘cognition  = 
life’, the clear point of contrast is that the subject and the object of knowledge 
                                                             
14 In fact, Hutto and Myin spend a lot of time arguing that causal and informational approaches to 
naturalizing content have failed, hence that we therefore have some reason to think we should 
abandon the hypothesis that all cognition requires representation.  This argument is untouched 
by the foregoing. 
15 Shannon 2010, also takes an enactivist, but not an enactivistb position.  Limitations of space 
preclude a discussion of this. AVANT  Vol. V, No. 2/2014 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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are  not  independent  but  are  mutually  constitutive”    (Stewart  1996:  316.)
16  
Stewart’s “objectivism” and “constructivism” seem to be versions of realism 
and anti-realism.  
In fact, it appears that at two points in this earlier paper Stewart understands 
cognition in a more traditional way, not as behavior, but as an internal mech-
anism that contributes to the production of behavior.  As the first point, there 
is his commentary regarding what appear to be (cognitive) mechanisms by 
which animals can cancel out the effects of bodily movements in order to per-
ceive organism independent objects. 
Animals with a central nervous system have the capacity to distinguish within 
their own cognitive repertoire between modifications of their sensory input 
which are the immediate consequence of their own actions, and modifications 
which are not so caused. For example, when an animal moves its eyes, the ret-
inal image (and hence the stimulation of the retinal cones) is modified, but 
a mammal does not usually confuse this movement with the movement of an 
object in its environment. The construction of perceptual invariants on the ba-
sis of motor-sensory correlations of this sort is thus at the basis of the emer-
gence of a ‘stable external world’ populated by ‘objects’ which exist as such in 
the cognitive repertoire of the organism itself. … Bacteria (or trees), for exam-
ple, are quite incapable of cognitive feats of this sort.  (Stewart 1996: 320). 
Here  it  is  at  least  possible  that  Stewart  conceives  of  there  being  cognitive 
mechanisms that enable (some) animals, but not bacteria and trees, to avoid 
confusing the effects of self-movement with the effects of object movement.  
In fact, these different mechanisms might be just the kinds of differences be-
tween (some) animals, on the one hand, and trees and bacteria, on the other, 
that cognitivists would contend mark the difference between cognitive and 
non-cognitive processes. As a second point, Stewart notes that 
                                                             
16 It is indicative of the cross-currents in enactivism that Hutchins 2010, was part of the Stewart, 
Gapenne, and Di Paolo Enaction anthology, but also apparently endorses the kind of computa-
tional theory of mind that Stewart would reject as “objectivist”.  Hutchins describes computation-
al transformations on representations of what appear to be navigator-independent features of 
the world: 
Two successive positions of a ship are plotted on a three-minute interval. Suppose the distance 
between them is 1500 yards. The navigator computes ship's speed to be 15 knots by doing the 
following: "The distance between the fix positions on the chart is spanned with the dividers 
and transferred to the yard scale. There, with one tip of the divider on 0, the other falls on the 
scale at a tick mark labeled 1500. The representation in which the answer is obvious is simply 
one in which the navigator looks at the yard-scale label and ignores the two trailing zeros" 
(Hutchins 1995…, 151-152). In this analysis, high-level cognitive functions were seen to be real-
ized in the transformation and propagation of representational states. The span between the 
fix positions on the chart is a representational state that is transformed into a span on the di-
viders. This representational state is then transformed into a span on the yard scale. Finally, 
the span on the yard scale is transformed into the answer by reading the label on the desig-
nated tick mark in a particular way.  (Hutchins 2010: 427). 
Hutchins, thus, also appears to be an enactivist, but not an enactivistb. The Enactivist Revolution 
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Armed with representations of this sort, an organism can set itself a ‘goal’ (ex-
pressed in terms of a desired perceptual configuration), and then by purely 
mental activity (without having to take the risks involved in proceeding by tri-
al and error by actually acting in the world) elaborate a sequence of actions 
which, according to these representations, can be expected to achieve that goal 
(Stewart 2010: 320). 
Here it looks likes there is a “purely mental activity” independent of actually 
acting in the world, i.e., independent of physical behavior in the world.  So, 
the discussion in Stewart, 1996, suggests that one can be an enactivist without 
being an enactivistb. 
 
6. Conclusion 
At the heart of this paper is the observation that some enactivists do not mean 
by “cognition” what traditionalists have meant by “cognition.”  There are, if 
you will, two concepts of cognition in play, a traditional concept and an enac-
tivist  concept.   This  observation would  seem  to be  entirely unproblematic.  
Moreover, it would seem to be entirely unproblematic to note that some enac-
tivists  use  “cognition”  to  describe  (a  kind  of)  behavior.    These  enactivists 
maintain that cognition is (viable) behavior.  These enactivists are enactiv-
istsb.    This  choice  of  terminology—or  this  way  of  theorizing,  if  you  will—
however, looks to be misleading.  Moreover, it is not misleading just for tradi-
tionalists.  It is misleading for even some enactivistsb.  By adopting a new con-
ception  of  cognition—by  thinking  of  behavior  and  cognition  as  the  same 
thing—enactivistsb  sometimes  overlook  ways  in  which  they  have  detached 
themselves from the traditions of cognitive science.  Enactivists are generally 
happy to break with these traditions, but there are also times when this break 
is not as complete as it should be.  There are times when they try to engage 
with mainstream cognitive science, but are hampered by the steps they have 
already taken to break with tradition.  One cannot solve the traditional mind-
body problem, if one is not dealing with (something near enough to) the tradi-
tional conception of the mind.  One might dissolve the problem or abandon 
the problem, if one rejects the traditional concept, but one cannot solve it.  
One cannot argue that cognition is embodied and extended, by observing that 
behavior is embodied or extended.  And, one cannot show that not all cogni-
tion involves representation by providing instances of behavior that do not 
involve representation.  None of these observations undermines the enactiv-
istb approach, much less any other enactivist approaches.  They merely draw 
attention to some missteps in the evolution of enactivismb.  Perhaps the safest 
route for enactivistsb is simply to make a clean break with traditional views.  
Perhaps enactivistsb should walk away from traditional views and leave them 
to their own devices. 
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